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Introduction
In many countries more than half of all university graduates are women and they have been full-time members of the labour force for decades. But women still seem to have large difficulties in getting to the top of the hierachy in companies. In 2012, only about 15 percent of the members of the boards of directors in EU countries were women, see EU Commission (2012). For the US, the picture is about the same. The largest US companies had a female proportion around 15 percent, see Terjesen has not yet been implemented but in most countries there is a heated debate on the question: Why have so few women succeeded in getting on the boards of directors even in countries where equal opportunity policies and affirmative actions have been in force for decades? In this paper, we aim to answer the question based on an empirical study of all large Danish companies in the private sector.
The contribution of this paper is to test on a large representative employer-employee panel data set of more than 5,000 Danish companies in the private sector alternative hypotheses on why so few women get on the boards of directors. In the existing empirical studies on this topic, which are most often based on survey data covering a relatively limited number of respondents, a number of hypotheses have been formulated explaining the lack of women on the boards of directors. The richness of the data set available for this study allows us to test these hypotheses on the actual changes of the gender composition of the boards during an 11-year period.
In Section 2 earlier empirical studies of the determinants of women's representation on boards of directors are shortly described, Section 3 puts up the hypotheses to be tested in this study, Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and offer some main descriptives of the management boards and boards of directors in Denmark.
Section 6 describes the estimation strategy. In Section 7, the empirical results and alternative endogeneity 2 and robustness checks are presented, and finally Section 8 discusses the results and concludes the study.
Earlier empirical studies
There is a considerable variation across countries with respect to the traditions or formal regulation of board composition and nomination processes. Formerly, in most countries it was the norm that the CEO and other members of the executive board were full members of the board of directors. In this case, theories and empirical evidence concerning female board members are by definition closely related to theory and evidence relating to female promotion rates into top executive positions. In Denmark, as in many continental European countries, this is not considered good corporate governance any longer, and the executive managers are seldom members of the board of directors (two-tier system). Another institutional aspect relates to the size of the company. Publicly listed companies which are typically larger companies have to comply with a number of regulations, including regulations with respect to independence of the board of directors, while smaller companies which are often family-owned companies, are less regulated and often board members are in family relations with the owners. Further, there may be regulation on the number of board members elected by the employees of the firm (in this study denoted 'staff members of the board'). In Denmark, firms with more than 35 employees are obliged to have staff members on their boards. The staff members are elected among the employees and may stem from all parts of the organization, including he lowest hierachic levels, i.e. staff members may be manual workers. Thus, staff members on the boards of directors are very different from 'insider board members' in a US company who are either present or former executive officers in the company, see for instance Farrell and Hersch (2005) . The number of staff representatives depends on the size of the board. Since the proportion of women among the staff board members is considerably larger than among other board members in large listed companies, see EU (2013) , the size of the company may influence the gender composition of the board. 1 The determinants of being elected as a female staff board member is expected to be a different process compared to be appointed as a board member elected on the general assembly by the stakeholders of the company or appointed by the nomination committee. We mainly focus on the determinants of the gender composition of the latter group in this study, i.e. the focus is on non-staff board members who are appointed by the owner or the nomination committee.
A number of empirical studies analyzes the competences of male and female board members. Most of these studies are based on surveys on a limited number of individuals, either female board members, members of nomination committees or other groups of agents who are responsible for appointing new board members.
Further, one of the key questions discussed in the literature is which competences are relevant for board membership. According to a study by Burke (1997a) based on a survey of Canadian female directors, the most important qualifications are 'strong track record, business contacts, an understanding of business and advanced education' (Burke, 1997a, p. 123 ) and being known personally by the CEO of the company or other board members (Burke, 1997b where he is presently executive officer). This evidence may be taken as an indication of higher barriers (or recruitment standards) for women than for men and may reflect direct or indirect and unconscious types of discrimination against women, see Oakley (2000). Burke (1997b) notes that the empirical evidence of the importance of personal networks with other (probably male) CEOs and board members and a track record in general indicates that this is a way of reducing uncertainty about a woman's actual competences,
i.e. this may reflect classical statistical discrimination mechanisms as discussed below. As a consequence of this mechanism and combined with the increasing efforts in many companies to increase board diversity, the relatively few women who succeed in getting into top executive positions or becoming directors in large companies become a highly demanded group of women who are often acting in a number of boards. These women tend to get more board offers than their male peers and they may be in a position where they are able to self-select into the most attractive and/or best performing companies, see Farrell and Hersch (2005) .
The increasing pressure for diversity which is present in many countries may be one of the factors explaining that the proportion of 'only-male' boards has been decreasing in these countries, see Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Dunn (2012) . However, very often this means that once the target is met with one woman on the 4 board, there are no further hires of women to the board, i.e. the one woman is supposed to fulfil the diversity requirement with respect to representation of women, often called tokenism behaviour. Farrell and Hersch (2005) estimate a model of the gender of new hires in US Fortune 500 and Service 500 companies in the 1990s. They find that the likelihood of hiring a woman for a board is significantly smaller if there is already one or more women on the board. Further, if a woman leaves the board, it increases the chance that she is substituted by another woman, and not a male board member. These empirical findings seem to support the token theory that women on boards of directors with exactly one female board member act as 'tokens' for all women instead of being considered board members on a par with all other (male) board members.
Hypotheses on gender composition of boards of directors
The lack of women in the boardrooms may be explained by a number of alternative theories ranging from theories of pure discrimination -for instance due to powerful male business leaders who may have disutility of having women on the board -to theories which explain the low female representation by lack of female competences or lack of female interest in demanding top management positions. Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) offer an extensive survey of the theories on women directors in corporate boards.
In this section, we aim to list and group the different theories in a few overall categories and to operationalize the theories into a few hypotheses which we are able to test empirically. The classical economic discrimination theory, see for instance Becker (1957) , simply states that individuals from minority groups may face discriminatory behaviour simply because firms, customers or colleagues dislike to engage with the minority group. This classical discrimination behaviour is seldom used to explain the low representation of women in the boardroom but the notion of 'old boys network' may basically reflect the same mechanisms.
Or as stated by Singh and Vinnicombe (2004, p. 479 ): '..senior women do not easily gain access to the boardroom where an elite group of male directors maintain their power'. Singh and Vinnicombe also stress in the same paper (p. 480) that these discriminatory mechanisms 'may be unintentional, subtle forms of discrimination.'
The sociological and management literature often explains the lack of women on boards by 'gender stereotyping' and 'homosocial reproduction' theories, see Schein (1973) and Kanter (1977) . The 'Think
Manager-Think Male' hypothesis says that there is a tight relation between sex role stereotypes and the characteristics which are requested in order to become a successful manager, i.e. there are different hiring standards for men and women, see Schein (1973) . The recruiting agents and even the potential female top managers or board members themselves tend to have gender stereotype views on what it takes to be in top management positions. This may give rise to the (statistical) discrimination effects described above. It may also affect women's perception of their own chances of getting board positions and their self-confidence with respect to filling the positions as a board member. The same behaviour is observed in recent experimental research on gender differences in competitive behaviour. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that women are more reluctant to engage in a competitive tournament incentive scheme than their male counterparts, even though female ability and performance equalize male ability and performance. Women may dislike competition more than men mainly because they may be less self-confident than men with respect to their own abilities. In line with these considerations, we expect that female-led companies, i.e. companies with a high share of women in the executive board or management board and especially firms which have women in the nomination committee, or a female chairman will tend to be less subject to gender stereotype views compared to firms with no females on the nomination committee. We denote this hypothesis the 'female-led' hypothesis.
During the latest decades, the number of companies with no women on the board has reduced significantly in many countries, see for instance Catalyst (2007) for the US Fortune 500 companies and Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) for UK FTSE companies. But very often only one woman is observed for years (among the board members who are not elected staff members), and it seems to be much more seldom to get the second woman on the board than the first one. This is often explained by the token theory, see Kanter (1977) . The 'token' board member is seen as representing the 'minority' in general, i.e. in this case women, and they are not to the same extent as other board members considered as a board member with broad board competences. Therefore only one woman is hired and the chance of hiring the second woman for the board is lower than for the first female hire. In the cases where more women eventually enter the board, this may change the perception of women, see Kanter (1977) , but here causality may of course also run the other way around: Only companies with fairly neutral gender views among the recruiting agents or the nomination committee may have more women on their boards. Thus, according to this hypothesis we may expect that companies which already have exactly one woman on the board have a lower probability of having a second (or more) woman on the board (among the elected non-staff members). This hypothesis is denoted the 'tokenism hypothesis'.
The concept of discrimination basically refers to a situation where equally productive workers are treated differently. Therefore, an important question is: Are women as competent as men when it comes to competences relevant for the tasks that a board of directors is responsible for? The role of the board is usually described by two main tasks: advising the management board, and monitoring, hiring, and firing the management board, see for instance Adams and Ferreira (2007 If the typical female pipeline to the boardroom flows through the executive suite, a next relevant question to pose is whether it is the same hiring standards which potential male and female board members face? Or are the hiring standards higher for women? Theories on statistical discrimination may explain that because female members in the boardroom and in top management positions are a minority, they are also subject to a larger uncertainty about their qualifications and competences, and this uncertainty may explain higher hiring standards for women, despite they may be as productive (i.e. competent) as their male peers, see for instance Bjerk (2008) . If women tend to socialize less than men with the recruiting agents (e.g. the members of the nomination committee) for instance because they are not participating in the same social networks as their male peers, this increases the 'risk' and uncertainty related to hiring a women for the board. Therefore, it may be rational for the nomination committee to set higher hiring standards for female board members. One way of setting a higher hiring standard or alternatively to reduce the 'risk' related to appointing a woman for the board, is to hire a woman who has already succeeded in getting to the top of a company, either as a CEO or on a management board or being a member of other boards of directors. If these mechanisms are taking place to a larger extent for women than for men, we should expect that the impact of the potential male and female 'pipelines' is different, i.e. that the size of the coefficient of the male 'pipeline' variable (share of males among the potential board members) is larger than for females.
Summing up, we test three main hypotheses on why so few women are observed on boards of directors in Danish companies. (i) There are few companies who are female-led, i.e. have a female chairman of the board of directors and female members of the nomination committee, (ii) female board members act as tokens and the chance of hiring more than 1 female board member is much lower than the chance of hiring the first female board member, and (iii) the pipeline of potential female board members is 'thin' because there are few qualified women for board positions and/or (iiia) the hiring standards are higher for the female 'pipeline' compared to the male 'pipeline'.
Data
The study is based on an unbalanced panel (employer-employee) data set of all privately owned or listed Further, we calculate the share of women in the companies with a university degree (and same figure for all employees), the share of white-collar and blue-collar occupations, the share of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants, board size dummies, firm size dummies, industry affiliation dummies; a dummy for being newly established, and dummies for positive firm export and import. The Experian register contains information on the names of the chairman and the other board members (which may be split into staff members elected among the employees in the company and non-staff members who are appointed by the nomination committee or the owners). The information on names is used to construct gender variables on board composition by using a program that defines all Danish female and male names. In a few cases names can be given to both girls and boys. These observations (including the firms where they are board members) are excluded from the sample.
The key variables relate to the three alternative hypotheses to be tested, i.e. the 'female-led', the 'tokenism', and the 'pipeline' hypotheses. The variable representing a 'female-led' company is a dummy which assumes the value of 1 if the chairman is a woman. We do not have information on the gender composition of the nomination committee and in many firms there is no nomination committee. But whether or not there is a nomination committee, the chairman of the board of directors typically will be the most powerful person with respect to appointing new board members. In order to test the token-theory, we define two indicator variables for having exactly 1 female non-staff board member and 2 or more female non-staff members, respectively. Finally, the pipeline variable is proxied by the share of women among all CEOs and VPs within the industry. As alternatives, we define the 'pipeline' as the lagged female share in the pool of potentials. The pipeline for males is defined in a parallel way. There is no simple way to define the relevant pipeline for board members, see the discussion above about relevant board competences. Therefore, we apply alternative specifications in order to shed light on which types of pipelines seem to affect board composition.
5 Descriptive statistics Table 1 [Insert Table 1 about here]
The share of female board members has been increasing slowly during the period 1997-2007, see Table 2 .
In 1997, there were only 6.7 percent females among the non-staff board members. The share of companies having a female chairman has also increased, more than doubled, from less than 2 percent to 4 percent between 1997 and 2007. The same holds for the pipeline of potential female board members stemming from executive top positions. In 1997, there was only 0.5 percent of all the companies in the sample which had a female CEO, a figure that has more than tripled, to 1.8 percent in 2007. Also the share of women in positions just below the CEO-level has increased, but not to the same extent as the proportion of women in the companies which holds a university degree. In 1997, the female share among employees with a university degree in the sample was 21 percent, increasing to 32 percent in 2007. This figure is more than three times larger than the female share among the VP-CEO group and the pool of potentials.
[Insert Table 2 about here] Table A1 summarizes the main variables for the full pooled sample and for three subgroups of companies which are the subgroups of companies that we use in the estimations: companies with a female chairman, companies with only one woman on the board of directors and firms with a relatively high proportion of women in their 'pipeline' denoted 'above VP_CEO firms' and defined as firms above the median with respect to the relative share of women in the VP-CEO 'pipeline'. Only 3 percent of the companies have a female chairman.
These companies tend to have a larger female share of employees, be smaller companies and not listed on the stock exchange, and have less import and export compared to the full sample. In the full sample, the share of women on boards is 11 percent and 9 percent among non-staff board members. In firms with a female chairman on the board of directors or "token firms" with exactly one female non-staff board member, the share of female board members is considerably higher, 39 and 16 percent, respectively. However, this is due to a larger female share among elected staff board members while the female share among non-staff board members is roughly constant around 8 percent. Firms with a share of women in the 'pipeline' above the CEOs is only 2 percent.
median are not very different from companies with a share below the median in any of the listed parameters in Table A1 . The same tendency holds for 'token firms' which do not seem to deviate much from other firms in the sample with respect to the listed variables.
Estimation strategy
To test the female-led, tokenism, and pipeline hypotheses, we implement both a simple OLS and a FE estimation approach where we are able to exploit the fact that we observe the same firms during a number of years, and therefore we can control for time-constant unobserved firm characteristics, u i . Specifically, we separately estimate the following linear models of the female share of board members:
In the first specification (1) the left-hand side variable, share of women on the board of directors, does not include the chairman. In specifications (2) and ( and a time-varying term v it , which we assume to be purely idiosyncratic. We apply a Fixed Effects (FE) specification which deals with the potential correlation between our variables of interest and time-invariant component. In model (1) we include an indicator variable for the year of change in chairman gender (from male to female) η it which controls for the fact that the year of change of gender of chairman is a mixed year with both a male and female chairman. The same is done in models (2) and (3). The inclusion of η it allows us to provide a DID estimate for the parameter of interest in the specification (1).
However, endogeneity might still be an issue for our FE estimates in case of reverse causality or correlation between our variables of interest and unobserved time-varying firm fixed effects. Thus, we cannot claim that our results represent causal effects since we do not have valid instruments at hand or other ways of identifying causal effects. However, we partly cope with such issues in the regression (1) by performing some endogeneity checks: for instance we check whether the inclusion of either 1-year lag or lead in w_chairman affects our main results substantially.
Results
The following paragraphs present findings from the implemented estimation strategy. Tables 3 to 6 report our main results while endogeneity tests and robustness checks are presented in Table 7 and in the Appendix (Tables A1-A5 ). Table 3 reports our main results on the female-led hypothesis. The first three columns refer to the OLS estimates, whereas the rest are FE (firm-specific) estimates. In columns (1) - (6) the dependent variable is the share of women among all board members. Columns (7) - (8) are based on the same specification as column (6), except for the dependent variable which is split into the female share among staff members (7) and female share among non-staff members (8) .
Main results
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The coefficient on w_chairman is significantly positive in columns (1) - (2), indicating that firms with a female chairman also seem to have more women on the board of directors beside the female chairman.
However, when more controls are added in the OLS estimations, the significance of the female chairman dummy disappears. The coefficient on w_chairman turns negative and significant when controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in the FE estimation in columns (4) - (6) . Not surprisingly, the explanatory power lowers in the FE approach as it captures the within-firm dimension only. The inclusion of all controls does not substantially affect the size and significance of our key parameter in the FE regressions.
Since the FE coefficients are our favorite estimates (we are interested in within-firm effects), we find that the presence of a woman as a chairman is associated with a reduction in the share of women on the board by about 7 percentage points (column 6). Columns (7)- (8) indicate that the coefficient in column (6) is consistently solely due to non-staff board members which are the board members where the chairman may influence the appointment. Thus, we do not confirm the female-led hypothesis. On the contrary, we find that a female chairman is related to fewer other female board members. The coefficient is sizable, a change to a female chairman in previous year is related to a reduction in the chance of another female board member by 9 percent. Though one should be careful not to take this as causal evidence, the result may fit with a tokenism story which is discussed below.
Interestingly, the within-firm proportion of women among the employees in the firm carries a positive and significant coefficient, see column (6) , meaning that firms with a larger share of female employees are more likely to have a female board member. Columns (7) - (8) show that this positive coefficient is consistently related to the chance that there are female staff members elected to the board of directors while this variable has no relation to the share of women among non-staff board members. There are no significant associations between the share of women holding a university degree and the share of (both staff and non-staff) women on boards. The size of the board seems to matter. Smaller boards with less than 7 board members have significantly fewer female non-staff members than larger boards with 7 or more board members. Since we also control for the size of the company, this correlation cannot reflect only firm size, i.e. larger firms tend to have larger boards and a larger proportion of women on the board for instance because they are more prone to follow the soft law guidelines of good corporate governance and the public pressure for gender diversity, see Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Dunn (2012) . One hypothesis might be that larger boards have been extended in order to increase diversity without having to reduce the number of male board members. Table 4 has the same structure as Table 3 but now the key right-hand side variable is the indicator for having 1 woman on the board. If the token theory shall not be rejected, we have to find a significantly negative coefficient of this indicator. This is clearly the case, and the FE results are very robust in columns (4) -(6) at a level of -0.2, i.e. having a female non-staff board member last year is related to a reduction in the chance of at least one more woman on the board in the present period by about 20 percentage points.
Columns (7) - (8) show that the 'token-effect' only refers to female non-staff members while the chances for female staff members to get on the board of directors is not significantly related to the presense of other female non-staff members. However, Table 4 also shows that having more than 1 female non-staff board member is associated with even lower chances (about 43 percent according to column (8)) for another female non-staff board member compared to a board with exactly 1 woman on the board.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The 'pipeline' hypothesis is tested in Table 5 where we include the lagged share of women in the pool of potentials in the industry, see the upper panel of Table 5 . The first hypothesis to be tested is that the female share in the 'pipeline' of potential top executives in the industry is positively related to the female share of women on the board of directors. The pool of potential top managers in the industry is not related to the share of female board members according to all FE models in Table 5 . Alternatively, we define the female 'pipeline' as the share of women among CEOs and VPs in the industry. The lower panel of Table 5 shows that now the size of the 'pipeline' has a significantly positive coefficient (0.23), implying that an increase in the female share of CEOs and VPs in the industry of 10 percentage points is related to an increase in the share of women non-staff board members by 2 percent. The size of the coefficient may not be large -there is a much lower relation than a 1 to 1 relation between the female 'pipeline' and the female share of non-staff board members which may of course reflect that our 'pipeline' proxy is not very precise.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
In order to compare with the male recruitment to the board of directors, we estimate models for male board members parallel to the models for females in Table 5 . If the hiring standards for men are lower in the recruitment to boards of directors, one should expect to find a (more) positive coefficient than for females of the the variable share_men_POP (t-1), i.e. the male proportion in the pipeline of the pool of potential top managers in the industry. This does not seem to be the case. As for women, the male coefficient in the upper panel of Table 6 in column (8) is insignificant and negative. However, the coefficient for the pipeline variable defined as the male share of CEOs and VPs in the industry is significantly positive and almost has the same size as for females. Our interpretation of this result is that the relevant pipeline for boards of directors (non-staff members) is CEOs and VPs. I.e. the road to the board of directors seems to go via the management suites!
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[Insert Table 6 about here]
Sensitivity analysis
Our sensitivity analysis consists of a number of separete endogeneity and robustness checks for the female chairman (female-led), tokenism, and pipeline hypotheses.
We run checks to exclude most of the endogeneity that may eventually affect the estimates concerning the female-led firm hypothesis. Table 7 reports such checks: in the first three columns we include the first lag of the chairman gender variable whereas the last three columns report estimates from the specifications including the first lead of this variable. We find that the estimates of the key variable 'female chairman' is robust to the inclusion of the lag and lead variables. In addition, the lead of the chairman gender never turns to be significantly different from zero. We take this evidence as an indication that our estimates are not significantly affected by any kind of anticipation effects or plausible bias due to simultaneity.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
In order to evaluate the robustness of our estimates, we rerun the FE models on a number of different sub-samples of firms: service and non-service industries; exporting and non-exporting firms; differently sized All robustness checks for the token hypothesis (Table A3) 
Conclusions and discussion
In this study we analyze the determinants of females on the board of directors based on a representative panel sample which covers all Danish companies in the private sector with more than 50 employees, i.e. more Secondly we test the tokenism hypothesis, saying that if there is already one woman on the board of directors (either the chairman or another board member among the non-staff board members), the probability of hiring another woman for the board in the subsequent period is lower. The tokenism hypothesis cannot be rejected. We find a robust and significantly negative coefficient for companies having exactly one woman on the board when controlling for observed and unobserved time-constant heterogeneity. The effect only relates to female non-staff members where the 'token' coefficient is -12 percent while the coefficient is insignificant for non-staff members. We also find that the chance of hiring one further women to the board of directors is significantly lower than the chance of hiring one more male board member if there are already 2 or more women on the board.
Finally, we test whether the share of female board members is related to the 'pipeline' of potential female board members and which of the female 'pipelines' seems to be the most relevant pipeline for board positions.
When estimating simple OLS regression models which do not control for unobserved fixed firm effects, there is a positive relation between the share of women employed in the company and the share of women on the board of directors. However, the significant coefficients disappear when estimating a fixed effects model, except for a few interesting results: When splitting the board members into board members elected by the employees in the company (staff members) and board members appointed by the nomination committee or elected by the owner or the stakeholders at the general assembly (non-staff), we find a significant and positive coefficient of the female share among all employees in the firm for staff members and a positive and significant coefficient of the lagged share of women among top executives (CEO or VP) in the industry.
Our interpretation is that a relevant pipeline for staff board members is the proportion of women among the employees and for the non-staff board members the relevant pipeline is female top executives within the In order to test a hypothesis that the hiring standards for males may be lower, i.e. also men who are in the pool of potential top managers but have not yet reached top executives positions, we test exactly the same pipeline models for men. Our results show exactly the same results as for the female pipeline models, i.e.
the relevant male share of the pipeline for board members also seems to be CEOs and VPs in the companies while the pipeline of managers at lower management levels is not positively related to the male share of board members.
The results in the present study indicate that the route to more women on boards seems to pass the executives lounges, i.e. an important way to increase the female proportion among non-staff board members is that more women reach top executive positions. The past moderate increase in the female share of nonstaff board members may reflect an outside pressure for diversity as specified in the soft law rules on good corporate governance. According to our results, there is a risk that this pressure often only will imply that one non-staff woman will get on the board but then the process of more gender diversity stops as expected by the token theory. Furthermore, it does not seem to start a process of more gender diversity on the board of directors to have a female chairman on the board. On the contrary, we find a negative correlation between having a female chairman and the share of other women on the board among the non-staff members which may reflect that the female chairman, though probably powerful in many cases, may also act as a token.
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